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Abstract
Interest groups have a vital role in international negotiations and carry the potential to influence their outcome. This article
contributes to discussions surrounding Brexit and institutional change in the EU, focusing on Article 50 negotiations and
stakeholder engagement. Drawing from theories on deliberative democracy and institutional legitimacy, we argue that
different groups are given access to the Chief Negotiator depending on the resources they can contribute. Assessing our
expectations, we inspect the entire interest group population that held meetings with Michel Barnier and his team from
2016 onwards. On the aggregate, we observe a pluralist approach. A closer inspection reveals a tightly knit circle of insiders
that hold unparalleled access. To the extent that these meetings offer a glance into the future of EU lobbying, European
trade and professional associations are likely to observe growing cohesion and significance. Conversely, UK private inter-
ests will see their presence and influence diluted as their relevance grows smaller in Brussels. Following the trends we
observe, think tanks and socioeconomic interests are likely to experience a continuous surge in their involvement in stake-
holder activities.
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1. Introduction
Negotiations between the EU and the UK about the lat-
ter’s withdrawal from the block, resemble a high-politics
international affair (see Leruth, Gänzle, & Trondal,
2019; Rosamond, 2016; Schimmelfennig, 2018). Interest
groups have a vital role in international negotiations and
carry the potential to influence Brexit’s outcome. They
act as a legitimizing force, a source of information and
public opinion, and as a pressure mechanism on both
parties (see Hurd, 1999; Walker, 1991). However, there
has been limited analysis of interest group representa-
tion in Brexit negotiations. Existing work focuses on eco-
nomic actors in specific sectors such as finance (Bulmer
& Quaglia, 2018; James & Quaglia, 2018; Lavery, 2017);
but misses systematically analysing stakeholder activi-
ty in formal procedures at the EU level (Burns, Gravey,
Jordan, & Zito, 2019).
Somewhat surprisingly, even less attention is placed
on the interaction between the EU’s Chief Negotiator
(CN) and interest groups, despite the former’s commit-
ment to stakeholder outreach (European Commission,
2016). By doing so, the literature ignores one of the
most central and impactful players in Brexit negotia-
tions; it treats a formal space where the CN and inter-
est groups meet as a black-box and leaves questions
about Article 50 negotiations and the future of stakehold-
er engagement in the EU unanswered.
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In this article, we assess the meetings between inter-
est groups and the EU’s CN, as an understudied area of
Brexit.Whereas numerous groups are interested inmeet-
ing with the CN, only a select few are able to. This gener-
ates three interconnected questions:Which groupsmeet
with the EU’s CN?Why do some groupsmeet more often
than others? Does this carry implications for stakeholder
mobilization after the UK’s departure?
We answer these questions arguing that the EU’s CN
and the Task Force he leads have a complex role. They
must convince the other side to move as close as possi-
ble to their position, while at the same time coordinate
with numerous actors who operate across levels of gov-
ernment (Eising, 2004; Marks, Hooghe, & Blank, 1996).
The task is highly political in the sense that both nego-
tiators emphasize normative ethical and ideological posi-
tions to justify and motivate actions, effectively framing
the process as a zero-sum game (see Barley & Kunda,
1992; Patzer, Voegtlin, & Scherer, 2018).
Through these formalmeetings the CN employs inter-
est groups to explore, legitimate, and disseminate his
position. Significantly, these meetings have three capac-
ity building functions impacting which actors are invit-
ed. First, they serve a bridge-building role, offering a
closed setting where central interests can exchange
opinions and reach compromise (Dryzek & List, 2003;
Eriksen, 2018; Goodin, 2008), favouring economic inter-
ests. Second, these meetings act as a depolarizing cham-
ber allowing third party perspectives to enter the nego-
tiating space and provide value consensus (see Estlund,
2009; Landemore, 2012; Naurin, 2007), favouring epis-
temic interests. Third, they are used tomaximize the CN’s
democratic credentials through groups representing pub-
lic constituencies (March & Olsen, 1984; Wood, 2015),
favouring civil society organizations.
We highlight that despite the pluralist image of
diverse participants, a smaller elite inner circle is like-
ly to hold disproportionate access (Coen, Lehmann, &
Katsaitis, 2020). We assess our argument drawing on the
CN’s online database that includes all meetings held with
organized interests (2016–2020).Wemap the entire pop-
ulation and examine which specific organizations met
with Michel Barnier and his team. The results provide
a nuanced perspective into interest groups involvement
in the negotiations. Trade and professional associations,
companies, think tanks, and NGOs are present in meet-
ings. However, the distribution changes when we consid-
er how often specific groups heldmeetings with the CN’s
team: EU level think tanks and associations, along with
UK NGOs hold notable presence.
This article contributes to discussions specifically
about interest group involvement in Brexit negotiations,
and the broader literature on stakeholder engagement
in EU consultation procedures. Empirically, the article
conducts a unique analysis mapping the organizations
meeting withMichel Barnier’s team. It provides a unique
dataset with 159 participants, representing 113 interest
groups. Complementing discussions on formal EU consul-
tations, we find that some groups are overrepresented
(see, for example, Coen& Katsaitis, 2019a; Dür &Matteo,
2016; Fraussen, Albareda, & Braun, 2020; Rasmussen &
Gross, 2015).
In doing so, we provide data that permits further
research on Brexit, consultations, and stakeholder activi-
ty; relevant to researchers and policymakers. Overall, we
address a key issue in Brexit research namely who are
the key organized interests involved during the negotia-
tions, and what implications does this carry. The plural-
ist nature that permeates EU intermediation is present
and is likely to be maintained. However, peak level asso-
ciations will be further strengthened, and UK econom-
ic interests will see a smaller presence. The article pro-
ceedswith a theoretical section that provides our central
argument and expectations, followed by a section on the
research design, which is proceeded by the analysis and
finally a discussion on the implications.
2. Meeting Michel Barnier: A Theoretical Appraisal
Michel Barnier, the CN, leads the Task Force that:
Coordinates all the Commission’s work on all strate-
gic, operational, legal and financial issues related
to the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union,
in full respect of European Council guidelines. This
includes the negotiations on the future relationship
with the UK, the implementation of the Withdrawal
Agreement, as well as the Commission’s ‘no-deal’ pre-
paredness work. (European Commission, 2016)
We assert that the EU’s CN and his team aim to manage
their central responsibilities in a legitimate and success-
ful way. The motivation behind this aim can be linked
to the CN’s individual mandate as a member of the
Commission (see Egeberg & Trondal, 2018), as well as
a rational-institutional interest to maintain and expand
his authority (Dunleavy, 2014; Scharpf, 1999). Because
the negotiations are framed as a zero-sum (redistribu-
tive) game, the CN must convince the UK side to move
closer to the EU’s position. Failure to do so potentially
carries irreversible ramifications for EU integration (see
Leruth et al., 2019), and in turn can have adverse impli-
cations for the CN and the Commission’s authority. That
is to say, a negative outcome for the EU and/or a dis-
honest negotiating strategywouldmake the Commission
appear less legitimate, reducing its relevance. A central
implication behind this assertion is that the CN does not
consider illegitimate negotiating methods, such as dis-
crediting campaigns or reneging signed agreements, as
an option.
To achieve his aim, the CN employs different tools
from the negotiation toolbox, this includes interest
group engagement (see Hurd, 1999; Walker, 1991).
As noted earlier, interest groups are only but a tool
within a broad toolbox that carries different options.
Stakeholder engagement allows the negotiator to estab-
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lish a more dominant position vis-à-vis his counterpart,
primarily the UK’s negotiating team, in a few ways.
By appearing as a well-accepted representative of
central and/or relevant interests the CN holds greater
political authority, i.e., she/he has comparatively greater
relevance as a representative, translating into great legit-
imacy to speak for interests over specific issues (Zurn,
Binder, & Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2012). In a settingwhere issues
are transnational, and constituencies do not necessarily
belong explicitly to the UK’s or the EU’s political sphere
but cut across them, the negotiator’s broad acceptance
(political authority) is a valuable currency. Put simply,
greater relevance to constituencies acts as an informal
vote, which allows one negotiating team to exert greater
pressure on to the other.
Through co-ordination a negotiator can steer inter-
est groups to apply pressure on her/his counterpart. This
indirect pressure can be informal for example through
unofficial meetings, and/or formal for example through
open statements or members’ campaigning. In doing so,
the CN essentially attempts to support advocacy coali-
tions that exert pressure on the UK team. The broader
and/or more relevant the coalition the greater the pres-
sure and the ability to coerce the counterpart closer to
the CN’s position (Cairney, 2015; Sabatier, 1998).
Stakeholder engagement formalizes a type of
information-exchange. Whereas interest groups and the
CN may engage informally or indirectly and exchange
information on issues related to Article 50, this does
not necessitate that all information is available through
these channels. The meeting’s formality not only con-
tributes to legitimizing factorsmentioned above, but also
in itself provides knowledge that improves the CN’s and
his team’s understanding (see Russo & Tencati, 2009).
Interest groups come in different shapes and sizes.
Even under the strictest definition, which in the EU
context would be an accredited lobbyist (see Coen &
Katsaitis, 2019b, for a discussion), the groups mobilized
in Brussels number in the thousands. To become a legit-
imate representative across a plethora of interests that
hold different positions across issues, operating across
levels and national boundaries is a daunting task. Facing
limited resources, the CN and his team can meet only a
few. We underscore two key points that form a central
frame around the article’s thesis.
First, deliberative procedures, such as meetings
between the CN and stakeholders, hold transformative,
depolarizing, and coordinative properties (see Dryzek,
1990; Eriksen, 2018) that aid the CN demonstrate his
relevance as well as select with which groups to meet.
We highlight that these meetings are formal, noted on
public record. Second, different types of interest groups
bring different qualities to the discussion linked to fac-
tors such as their organizational incentives, their princi-
pals, and the constituencies they represent (Streeck &
Schmitter, 1991; Zurn et al., 2012). Below we expand
on this logic, outlining our expectations regarding which
types of groups the CN meets and why.
To begin with, deliberative procedures have a col-
laborative and coordinative character that allows actors
to exchange opinions and reach agreement. By hold-
ing meetings with peak socioeconomic interests, such
as professional and trade associations, business associ-
ations, and trade unions, the CN can establish a com-
mon position that includes central interests’ perspec-
tives vis-à-vis Brexit. Simultaneously, in doing so the CN is
inclusive of and open to the most populous group mobi-
lized in Brussels broadly categorized as private or eco-
nomic interests. These groups face strong mobilization
endogenously as their members scramble in anticipation
of Brexit to gain valuable information and attempt to
influence its outcome.
Nevertheless, Brexit’s high-stakes political character
invokes the use of normative ethical and moral argu-
ments to justify the negotiators’ motivation and actions
(Ditto, Pizarro, & Tannenbaum, 2009; Rosati, 1996). This
can cause problems in reaching common points of
agreement both endogenously as well as exogenously
(Martill & Staiger, 2020). Normative positions can be
open ended and opposing, leading to polarization and
sincere difficulty in obtaining common value positions
(see Estlund, 2009). In a polarized environment, delibera-
tive procedures can lead to group think and policy blind-
spots and/or policy gridlock (Sunstein & Hastie, 2015;
Whyte, 1998).
Research organizations such as think tanks and uni-
versities provide epistemic justification establishing the
scientific method as a common ground for different eth-
ical standpoints, de-polarizing deliberation (Dunlop &
Radaelli, 2013; Holst & Molander, 2019). Furthermore,
due to their research capacity, they are likelier to have
taken normative counter arguments into consideration,
their relevance and reputation is linked directly with
their ability to contemplate contrasting perspectives.
This allows the CN to form alliances with broader inter-
est groupnetworks, and set-up conceptual-technical safe
spots within which to negotiate with the UK team. Thus,
we expect to see research organizations invited to meet-
ings with the CN.
Stakeholder engagement is also used to broaden citi-
zen participation in policymaking (March & Olsen, 1984).
The objective is dual. By involving organized interests
representing social/public interests such as civil society
and NGOs, policymakers respond to an innate critique
of EU policymaking procedures being elite and exclusion-
ary (see Schmidt, 2020). Civil society involvement allows
policymakers to bolster their democratic credentials
(Katsaitis, 2015). In the same way, public participation in
deliberative events linked to policymaking tends to man-
age expectations and improve outcomes’ public appreci-
ation (Lee & Romano, 2013; Wood, 2015). We note that
while these socioeconomic interests represent numer-
ous organizations, large scale transnational companies
will receive similar attention, i.e., European champions.
Because the CN represents the EU, EU level associations
are likelier to be invited than national associations.
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In addition, by inviting interest groups from nation-
al constituencies the CN attempts to maintain his legit-
imacy vis-à-vis member states’ public opinion. This fac-
tor is a concern for the Commission and becomes espe-
cially relevant when considering the potential impact of
the UK’s departure on the Commission’s future authority.
Thus, some national interests remain relevant either due
to economy-size related factors (Hall & Soskice, 2003;
Thelen, 2012), as well as issue specific factors (Bulmer &
Quaglia, 2018). Therefore, trade and professional asso-
ciations, companies, and business associations from cen-
tral EU economies are likelier to be present, such as from
Germany, France, and the UK (Eising, 2004). Moreover,
to reduce the UK negotiator’s political authority, the CN
may welcome UK based civil society groups. Signalling to
the UK team that the EU’s CN also represents part of the
UK’s public interest, i.e., the UK team does not represent
a cohesive public constituency. Focusing on constituen-
cy specific factors some social interests might observe
greater participation due to issue salience for example,
civil society groups from Northern Ireland.
The above dimensions frameour expectations regard-
ing the groups’ diversity, which is to say what types of
groups are likely to be present in meetings with the CN
and why. We also consider that specific groups tend
to participate in such meetings more often than oth-
ers. From a large interest group population, the CN will
invite a core group of interests more often than others
(Binderkrantz, 2005; Broscheid & Coen, 2003). By doing
so, the CN legitimizes these associations through their
participation, verifying their role as representatives of
their members. By galvanizing support for these interests
as trusted go-to groups, these organizations act as amedi-
ating point between the CN and the broader population.
In summation, the CN and his team face a complex
task. He must represent the EU in a high-politics game
and convince the UK to move closer to his position. In an
international negotiation such as Brexit, there are dif-
ferent options in the CN’s toolkit. Stakeholder engage-
ment is one of the central tools in the kit. The CN will
meet with different organizations to legitimate his posi-
tion as a representative of states and organized interests.
These meetings serve three different ideal-type purpos-
es. First, they allow the CN to establish common areas
of agreement and support from socioeconomic interests.
Second, it allows the CN to depolarize the discussion and
ensure a common value system through research orga-
nizations participation. Third, it provides the CN with
democratic credentials through civil society’s mobiliza-
tion (see Box 1).
We underscore that this article does not take deliber-
ative procedures as panacea or as the single most impor-
tant tool that the CN holds at his disposal, as he attempts
to achieve his objectives. We recognize that deliberative
procedures face their own valid limitations (Lee, 2011;
Lee & Romano, 2013), we also recognize that the negoti-
ations hold a central institutional and intergovernmen-
tal component (Smeets & Beach, 2020). Nevertheless,
interest groups represent an important EU policymak-
ing cog. By examining the interaction between interest
groups and the CN we can understand which actors are
insiders, the particular forum’s purpose, and estimate
what implications it carries for the future of stakehold-
er mobilization.
3. Research Design
To explore these expectations, we require information
on which interest groups the CN has held meetings with.
This information is published online on the European
Commission’s webpage dedicated to the negotiations
on Article 50 between the EU and the UK (European
Commission, 2016). However, this information is avail-
able in the form of a non-downloadable table that
includes: the date of the meeting, the location of
the meeting, the entities met, the meeting’s subject(s).
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to
assess which interest groups met with Michel Barnier’s
team; to ensure the study’s validity and reliability we
chose to collect the data manually. We collected the
entire dataset with published meetings from 14 October
2016 to 29 May 2020.
We note two clarifying points. First, the entities
met are not categorized, i.e., they are not classified.
For example, the CN met with representatives from
Airbus, however Airbus is not classified as a specific type
of organization on the list. Second, whereas meetings
can have different subjects, the subject noted largely
falls in one of two categories that depend on the stage
of the negotiations: (i) “Meeting with the Task Force
for the Preparation and Conduct of the Negotiations
with the United Kingdom under Article 50 TEU,” or
Box 1. Expectations of interest groups participating in meetings with the CN.
E1: To improve his negotiating position as a representative of vital European interests the CN will invite EU level
socioeconomic groups.
E2: To form a depolarized negotiating space that allows the CN and counterparts to establish common value positions
based on which to form agreement, the CN will invite epistemic organizations.
E3: To manage expectations and improve public support, the CN will invite UK public interests to meetings, such as
civil society groups.
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(ii) “Meeting with the Task Force for Relations with the
United Kingdom.” Themeetings on the database start on
14October 2016 and run up to date. The formermeeting-
subject runs from October 2016 until December 2019,
and the latter from January 2020 onward.
We opted tomaintain and assess the groups thatmet
with the CN following December 2019 along with the
population beforehand. Whereas the EU–UK relation-
ship has moved to a different stage the long-term nego-
tiations that are following do not change the CN’s aims
and motivations. We placed each interest group under
one of nine categories based on their self-registration
on the EU’s Joint Transparency Register, we highlight
that the CN and his team will meet only with groups
registered on the Joint Transparency Register. In the
exceptional case where an interest group was not reg-
istered, we used their self-description on their web-
site to place them in one of the categories: (i) busi-
ness association (Association des Banques et Banquiers,
Luxembourg; Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie);
(ii) company (e.g., Airbus, Crédit Agricole); (iii) consul-
tancy (e.g., Albright Stonebridge Group); (iv) NGO (e.g.,
International Rescue Committee); (v) public mixed enti-
ty (e.g., Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions,
Londonderry Port & Harbour Commissioners); (vi) reli-
gious (e.g., Commission of the Episcopates of the
EuropeanUnion); (vii) research organization (e.g., Centre
for European Policy Studies, Centre for European Reform,
North West Regional College); (viii) trade and profes-
sional association (e.g., European farmers, European
Fisheries Alliance); (ix) trade union (e.g., European
Trade Union Confederation, Sveriges Akademikers
Centralorganisation).
We also categorized groups in one of three categories
based on their level of operation i.e., which level of inter-
ests they primarily represent. Interest groups can be rep-
resenting: (i) EU level interests (e.g., Bureau Européen
des Unions de Consommateurs); (ii) national level
interests (e.g., Association des Banques et Banquiers,
Luxembourg); (iii) multinational interests (e.g., ABB).
In our analysis meeting frequency is a central vari-
able. Since the population of meetings and interests is
rather small, we focused on employing descriptive analy-
ses. We conduct a two-level analysis. First, we note how
often a type of group has met with the CN, the objec-
tive is to understand which types of groups are popular.
Therefore, we evaluate the popularity of an interest
group category by examining the population size rela-
tive to the meetings held. Secondarily, we are interest-
ed in assessing the specific groups that form an elite cir-
cle of insiders. Considering the limited number of meet-
ings, we proceeded by assessing which groups met with
the CN a minimum of two times or more. The analysis
is framed by our conceptual model and complimented
by articles in this thematic issue. Having said that, we
appreciate the methodology’s limitations and welcome
further work that enriches it. For example, approaches
that seek to clarify actors’ motivations and causal mech-
anisms through interviews or additional secondary-data.
4. Analysis
We begin our analysis with a breakdown of the inter-
est group population that held meetings with the CN
and note some initial observations (Table 1). The CN
held meetings with a diverse crowd of interest groups.
Most of these groups belong to the private sphere: trade
and professional associations, business associations, and
companies represent the majority of the population and
the meetings held.
In line with our expectation, this activity follows
a demand-supply argument. The CN is responding to
the large business interest community that has mobi-
lized due to Brexit, its support is needed to maintain
and expand his legitimacy as a negotiator. On the one
hand, these groups wish to gather information about
the negotiations’ progress, influence the CN, and con-
cede guarantees that their business will be affected as
little as possible. On the other hand, the CN holds meet-
ings with economic interests to coordinate his response,
Table 1.Meetings per type of interest group, and distribution of interest group type across the population.
Number of Percentage of Number of Percentage of
Type Meetings Meetings % Organizations Population %
Research Organization 29 18 20 18
Trade & Professional Association 29 18 17 15
Company 28 18 23 20
Business Association 24 15 18 16
NGO 20 13 13 12
Trade Union 18 11 11 10
Professional Consultancy 6 4 6 5
Public Mixed Entity 4 3 4 4
Religious 1 1 1 1
Total 159 100 113 100
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ensuring from his perspective that a central constituency
is supportive.
Research organizations hold a visible position among
groups that met with the CN. This result is in line
with a growing body of work that recognizes research
organizations rising prominence in Brussels, specifically
think tanks (Kelstrup, 2016;Monange, 2008; Sherrington,
2000). The analysis points to a discrepancy between
the overall mobilized lobbying population in Brussels
and think tanks access to elite political actors and pro-
cedures (Coen & Katsaitis, 2019a). Research organiza-
tions serve a critical role as third party actors that can
provide expertise, which acts as a depolarizing device
that makes coordination between the CN and busi-
ness interests easier. This is not to say that meetings
with research organizations necessarily influence the CN
directly. Research organizations, such as think tanks, pro-
vide a common and acceptable technical basis upon
which the CN and his counterparts can negotiate, mini-
mizing polarized rhetoric’s adverse effects (see Missiroli
& Ioannides, 2012).
In contrast, on the aggregate, public interest groups
(e.g., NGOs) and socioeconomic interests (e.g., trade
unions), represent a smaller proportion of the popula-
tion. From a bird’s eye view, it appears that grassroots
movements are neither core legitimizing forces nor is
their role as pressure mechanisms central to the CN.
With this observation, we wish to highlight the variation
within categories (see Table 1), and the role of insiders.
We discuss this issue in greater detail in the paragraphs
that follow.
Moving from the type of groups meeting with the CN
we also assess the level of interests they represent (see
Figure 1). The CN has held meetings with a considerable
number of organizations representing primarily nation-
al interests (35%). However, EU level interests remain
the majority (45%), multinational interests represent a
smaller proportion (20%). We highlight that most groups
representing EU groups and multinational level interests
have a dedicated government affairs office in Brussels
(see Figure 2). The remaining groups have an office pri-
marily in Europe and specifically in the UK, France, or
Germany. That is to say, the CN focuses on meeting with
interest groups across levels rather than explicitly EU lev-
el groups, underscoring that his strategic concern and rel-
evance also runs through national capitals.
As mentioned earlier, the aggregate analysis tends to
support the understanding of Brexit as a trade negotia-
tion that automatically gives economic interests a seat at
the head of the table. However, a closer inspection (see
Table 1), suggests that some specific groups meet with
the CN more often than others. To better explore which
groups meet more often with the CN, we raise the mini-
mum number of meetings held per group to two. In oth-
er words, we focus on a smaller circle that has greater
access to the CN. The image changes substantively (see
Figure 3), please note that research organizations are re-
classified as ‘think tank’ because all research organiza-
tions at this stage are think tanks. Out of a total 113 dif-
ferent interest groups, there is a limited 25 that havemet
with the CN more than once (mean number of meetings,
2.84). Indicatively, these 25 groups cover approximately
45% of all meetings. While the role of trade and profes-
sional associations becomes more evident, the analysis
underscores think tanks involvement. Whereas the CN
is responding to economic interests by holding multiple
meetings with them, some groups offer more in terms of
their ability to coordinate, depolarize, and publicly legit-
imize the CN.
Following from this, we were interested in unveiling
the elite circle of insiders that met with the CN often.
Along these lines, we added a stronger filter on the
population focusing on groups that held a number of
meetings above the mean of 2.84, i.e., groups that met
with the CN three times or more. We assess these elite
interest groups qualitatively (see Figure 4); three points
become apparent.
First, EU level as well as national level interest groups
maintain an important role for the CN’s negotiating strat-










Figure 1. Interest groups representing national, EU, or multinational interests.


































Figure 2. Interest groups government affairs’ office stated location.
a pressure mechanism cuts across levels. Nevertheless,
the image is intricate. UK companies and private inter-
ests more broadly have limited presence in this elite
circle; however, UK trade unions and UK NGOs are wel-
come. This supports our expectation that UK public inter-
ests act as a tool through which the CN can pressure the
UK team. In addition, it suggests that UK economic inter-
ests have opted for a different route of communication
and coordination with the CN: the European level associ-
ation. Overall, trade unions have an elevated role, provid-
ing further support to the argument that interest groups
serve as a social coercion mechanism. Simultaneously,
while think tanks participate in meetings, at the elite lev-
el they represent exclusively EU level organizations, the
same applies to trade and professional associations (see
COPA, COGECA, EUFA in Figure 4).
The insiders’ list reflects central policy issues the
negotiations focused on. Indicatively, farming and fish-
eries with distinct (re)distributive and political concerns
as well as mobility and employment issues, require
the CN coordinates extensively with relevant interest
groups. Similarly, transnational business actors repre-
sented through the European Round Table for Industry
(and BusinessEurope) are highly visible. Airbus, the EU
company-project that sees airplane parts constructed
across different European countries, including the UK,
before being assembled in specific locations, has natu-















Figure 3. Percentage meetings per type of interest groups, two meetings minimum.
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Vereniging VNO-NCW (VNO-NCW)
Trades Union Congress (UK) (TUC)
the3million (t3m)
European Round Table for Industry (ERT)
European farmers (COPA)
European agri-cooperatives (COGECA)
Centre for European Reform (CER)
British in Europe (BiE)
European Policy Centre (EPC)
European Fisheries Alliance (EUFA)
Airbus
European Trade Union Confederation
1 2 3 4 5 6 70
Institut Jacques Delors / Jacques Delors
Institute (IJD / JDI)
Figure 4. Number of meetings per organization, 3 meetings minimum.
Leading to necessary meetings to coordinate (or avoid)
a multi-billion divorce. That is to say, we observe the
nature of the policy field and issue salience as addition-
al variables influencing whom the CN meets more often.
This falls in line with a growing body of work highlighting
the Commission’s reaction to public opinion, and what
can be more broadly termed as ‘politicization’ (De Wilde
& Rauh, 2019). These results offer valuable information
about Michel Barnier’s stakeholder engagement and its
purpose. Moreover, they offer a glance into EU interest
intermediation after the UK’s departure, which we dis-
cuss in the final section below.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
In support of stakeholder engagement, the EU’s CN and
his T50 teammeet with interest groups. This article’s aim
was to assess which groups meet with the CN, why do
some groups meet with the CN more often than oth-
ers, and to estimate a future trajectory of stakeholder
mobilization in the EU after the UK’s departure. With
this in mind, we argued that the CN has an incentive
to meet different types of groups, each organizational
type offers a resource that can improve the CN’s negotiat-
ing position. Nevertheless, it is likely that the CN and his
team will show greater preference towards some organi-
zations over others. Following a formulation of expecta-
tions, we examined the entire interest group population
that met with the CN from October 2016 until May 2020.
The analyses largely support our expectations.
Employing these meetings to legitimize his position in
a high-politics game, the CN meets with central socioe-
conomic actors that can act as a coercion mechanism,
and research organizations that can provide a common
technical basis that depolarizes the debate, allowing
the negotiations to move forward. Significantly, the
results confirm that not all groups are created equal.
Highlighting the meetings exclusivity, the last four years
113 groups met with the CN. This contrasts the large
interest group populations mobilized and examined by
the literature, whether they are in Brussels, registered
on the Joint Transparency Register and have an accredi-
tation. To the best of our knowledge, these meetings are
some of the most elite (formal) deliberative procedures
in Brussels at the moment. The specific groups meeting
the most with the CN belong to the elite of the elite.
Considering the type of interest intermediation, the
current picture resembles the EU’s format with a twist.
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We observe a pluralist approach with a diverse constel-
lation of interest group types. Looking at all the inter-
est groups active in the consultation, we continue to
see a form of EU elite pluralism where trade and profes-
sional associations and companies take up a significant
portion of the meetings (Coen, 1997). These groups are
de facto a larger part of the interest group population,
they have a greater direct incentive to mobilize, and the
resources to do so. Moreover, due to networks estab-
lished over time, their access to such elite stakeholder
events is likelier. Surprisingly, research organizations and
think tanks also hold a prominent role, as these organiza-
tions have a growing importance within Brussels’ policy
circuit: We call for further research assessing their role in
EU policymaking. At the same time, it indicates a distinct
need for epistemic expertise that goes beyond tradition-
al socioeconomic players and grassroots organizations.
Unsurprisingly, EU level interests receive primary
attention however, national interests are also present.
Indicating that the CN must engage with groups across
levels to legitimize his role, and to create a multi-
level coalition to improve the EU’s negotiating posi-
tion. Nevertheless, when we observe the insiders’ circle
research organizations, trade and professional associa-
tions are distinctly from the EU level, while trade unions,
NGOs, and business associations represent a mix. On the
surface this distribution suggests that little has changed
and is likely to change in EU—considering interest group
interactions vis-à-vis Brexit. Nonetheless, when we drill
down to the specific groups meeting with the CN the
most, some characteristics become clearer. First, UK
companies are absent from the insiders’ list in contrast
to their overall presence in Brussels, and different to the
position UK NGOs and trade unions hold.
Considering these results Brexit is likely to have two
divergent effects on interest mobilization in Brussels.
Because the EU aims to protect its (economic) interests,
UK business will continue to lose access to EU policymak-
ers. Since UK business interests need to maintain a good
relationship primarily with the UK government, theymay
be less likely to formally request meetings with the CN.
In this difficult position, British companies’ best option is
to be represented in Brussels via EU level associations.
Naturally, this will dilute their ability to influence out-
comes as outsiders even within these organizations.
Conversely, as the UK public will have no access to
political procedures in Brussels the EU will open-up its
space towards UK public interests. This serves to main-
tain the EU’s legitimacy vis-à-vis a portion of theUK’s pub-
lic as well as EU based nationals in the UK; these groups
can be utilized as a direct social pressure mechanism in
the future. At the same time, it helps manage the con-
stituency’s expectations through meetings that provide
information and resources to nurture the relationship in
a post-Brexit environment. Put differently, it will be hard-
er to numb pro-EU mobilization in the UK as access to
political resources will still be available through a differ-
ent, yet smaller, route.
Somewhat ironically, the UK’s departure, with its plu-
ralist interest intermediation, might trigger greater plu-
rality in stakeholder engagement in Brussels in terms of
public interest participation. Simultaneously, it is likely
push EU level interests closer together, socioeconomic
interests have greater incentive to solidify their role as
forums and public representatives. Specific policy areas
might see greater mobilization by domestic interests fol-
lowing the UK’s departure. Nonetheless, the dynamic we
see here reflects broader patterns. Issues such as fish-
eries or agriculture will see greater interaction between
the EU and EU level associations that can help coordinate
and ensure a common front against UK counterparts.
Simultaneously, larger EU economies and their associa-
tions will gain greater relative importance. This places
specific national coalitions closer to the EU sphere and in
turn makes their voices stronger within peak level asso-
ciations. The implication being that some perspectives
will become highlighted, how this translates into policy
impact remains to be seen.
We point out that this research area is a fast-moving
target that will unfold and develop over time, as addi-
tional negotiations are needed to agree on the specifics
within policy fields. We call for further work assess-
ing the mobilization of UK interest groups, their strate-
gies, and their involvement in EU procedures following
Brexit. The analysis underscores interest groups’ role
as social pressure and legitimizing mechanisms in polit-
ical procedures. Future work that engages more closely
with the mechanics of interest group impact on poli-
cy can offer valuable empirical and conceptual materi-
al, contributing further to EU interest intermediation’s
nuanced assessment.
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